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 Abstract: The market for regional jets is an excellent example of imperfect competition, with 
two firms, Canada’s Bombardier and Embraer of Brazil, competing for market share. In a market with 
non-cooperative rivalry, governments have an incentive to subsidize a domestic firm and thus increase 
its profits at the expense of a foreign firm. However, strategic trade theory tells us that subsidy 
competitions like the one between Canada and Brazil in the regional jet market are jointly suboptimal. 
Moreover, under the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, subsidies meant 
to stimulate exports are illegal. In fact, Canada and Brazil both brought charges against each other at 
the WTO and won. Despite the jointly suboptimal nature of subsidies and the forum for dispute 
resolution provided by the WTO, the dispute between the two countries dragged on for years.  
 The first aim of this study was to show that the use of export subsidies in the regional jet 
market was suboptimal. The second goal was to identify the factors that prevented an agreement to 
limit subsidies, based on reviewing literature on WTO disputes and studying the political and 
economic influence of the two firms. By using a simple calibration model my preliminary results 
show a combined net welfare loss for the two countries of roughly $260 million. Furthermore, my 
research indicates the WTO enforcement mechanism, the economic value of the two firms, and the 
firms’ political influence all contributed to intransigence and a delayed compromise. Although the 
WTO was never designed as a potent enforcer of its own rules, cases in which the economic 
importance of a firm translate to enduring non-compliance undercut both the legitimacy of the WTO 
and the free trade regime it supports. 	  	  
Strategic Trade Theory in the Brazil-Canada WTO Dispute 
 
 In requesting consultation with Brazil on June 19th, 1996, Canada fired the first 
shot in what would become a nasty trade war and a lengthy World Trade Organization 
dispute (WTO). At the heart of this disagreement lay an intense competition in the 
regional jet market. Bombardier of Canada and Embraer of Brazil, both sources of 
national pride and major employers, were the first aircraft manufacturers to recognize the 
untapped demand for regional jets (aircraft that seat between 30 and 100 passengers) and 
develop products to exploit said market niche. Both companies also benefitted from 
considerable government support, as developing, manufacturing, and financing aircraft 
are generally considered too risky for private capital. As demand for regional jets 
exploded and competition between the two firms intensified, both firms demanded more 
support from their respective governments on the grounds that the firm could not survive 
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without public funding (Hadekel, 161, 2004). At face value, the emptying of government 
coffers to support these companies seemed like prudent industrial policy; the firms 
exported the kind of technologically sophisticated, value-added goods that each 
government craved. Moreover, the aviation industries that government largesse fostered 
created thousands of high paying jobs that would keep elected officials in office. And yet, 
even with both sides following a generally similar logic for nurturing a civil aircraft 
industry, each country blamed the other of maliciously violating WTO law in order to 
undercut its rival and reap the rewards of market leadership. As each side filed suit at the 
WTO and began to dig its heals in, it became increasingly obvious that subsidization was 
only good for creating a convoluted and vitriolic WTO dispute. Beyond just the surface 
level of creating a heated WTO dispute was the rather self-evident economic logic that 
unfettered subsidization was detrimental to joint societal welfare. Nevertheless, the 
dispute between Canada and Brazil would push each government to further subsidize 
their firms, end up lasting almost a decade, and spill over into other issue areas.  
 Beyond just highlighting the diplomatic tensions this dispute generated, the aim of 
this paper will first be to establish the jointly suboptimal nature of Brazil and Canada’s 
subsidy war. Correspondingly, the second goal of this paper will be to investigate why 
Brazil and Canada failed to resolve their costly dispute given that they had an established 
avenue of dispute resolution in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) at 
their disposal. Since our economic understanding of subsidy disputes stresses how an 
agreement to limit subsidies would be mutually beneficial, the overriding question of this 
paper becomes what domestic political considerations along with the nature of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement process discouraged a resolution to this dispute.  
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 To accomplish these two objectives, the first section of this paper will lay out a 
definition of a high-tech industry and explain why governments covet them so much. I 
will then outline the histories of Bombardier and Embraer in order to demonstrate how 
developing an aviation industry was a priority for both governments and how government 
support was critical to each firm’s success. Following that section the general contours of 
the WTO dispute between Canada and Brazil will be outlined before contextualizing the 
subsidy dispute by examining the strategic trade policy literature. In the empirical section 
of this paper I will briefly describe the model used1 and then present my results that 
support the theoretical claim that subsidies are jointly suboptimal. Using the deleterious 
nature of subsidies as a point of departure, I will argue that survival-maximizing 
governments, embedded policy goals, and WTO law itself are responsible for the 
duration and severity of this dispute. 
High-tech Industries 
 High-technology industries and their trade in global markets have assumed a 
central position in industrial competitiveness and the concerns of economists and 
policymakers alike. This concern is not without reason as success in high-tech industries 
has been shown to confer outsized benefits in “productivity, technology development, 
and high-wage job creation”(Tyson 1992, 2). Therefore, strength in technologically 
intensive sectors is essential for a nation’s economic expansion and dynamism. 
Paramount amongst the benefits of high-technology firms is the spillovers and 
externalities they create for a nation’s economy. The presence of a successful high-tech 
firm and its demand for inputs can help upstream industries flourish as well as generate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This static model was provided by Dr. Sheldon and is used to show the impact of a policy change on 
societal welfare. 
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invaluable research and development (R&D) that is unlikely to occur without it. What is 
more, many policymakers view capturing the advantages of these industries as the 
building blocks towards the economy of the future. The concern, then, is of path 
dependence, i.e., that failing to nurture strategic high-tech industries today could doom a 
country’s economy tomorrow. 
 High-tech industries also have a unique set of market characteristics that 
distinguish them further from typical sectors; namely, they are extremely capital- 
intensive, subject to fierce international competition, and tend to be imperfectly 
competitive oligopolies. Furthermore, high-technology industries rely heavily on research 
and development and, despite recent gains by some emerging economies, are highly 
concentrated in the developed world.  Of these attributes, imperfect competition has the 
most meaningful implications for policymakers and economists. Classical understanding 
of international trade rests on the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and is 
guided by the Ricardian notion of comparative advantage. Perfectly competitive markets 
are characterized by a lack of barriers to entry or exit and a large number of small firms 
with homogenous products. In comparison, the imperfectly competitive markets of high-
technology industries are difficult to enter, occupied by a few large firms, and “economic 
profits are not driven to zero”(Eaton & Grossman 1986, 384). Due to these excess 
economic profits, or “rents”, governments have an incentive to manipulate these markets 
and shift profits to domestic firms. In fact, “a nation’s competitive position in industries 
with these characteristics is less a function of its national factor endowments and more a 
function of strategic interactions between its firms and government”(Tyson 1992, 3).  
Fundamentally, the ability of governments to influence the outcomes of these 
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international oligopolies in favor of their domestic firms is what makes competition in 
these markets so fierce and contentious. 
 For its part, “the international market for large commercial jet aircraft is about as 
far as one can get from the standard trade theory paradigm of static constant returns and 
price-taking competition”(Baldwin & Krugman, 1988, p.45). Instead, the industry is a 
perfect example of a high-tech industry as it is dominated by a small number of firms, 
requires continual research and development, and demands highly technical production 
that represents a sizeable barrier to entry. The industry is also unique in that product 
development is quite risky and the payback period for an investment is exceedingly long. 
Thus, “the market risks and long-term loan repayment rates typical for aerospace… are 
prohibitive for private capital” (Froese, 2010, p.83). Governments, on the other hand, see 
opportunity where private investors balk as the spillover effects from a strong aerospace 
industry can be exceptionally rewarding for a domestic economy. For example,  
“Chase Economics estimated in 1983 that an increase of $1 billion in sales of civil 
aircraft would result in a $6.5 billion gain in U.S. gross national product over nine years, 
a $3.7 billion cut in the federal deficit, and 148,400 full-time equivalent man-years of 
work”  
More broadly, a successful aerospace industry will provide high-wage jobs and value-
added exports. The following sections will aim to underscore the point that aerospace 
industries are attentively nurtured and jealously guarded by governments by outlining the 
history of government support for both Embraer and Bombardier.  
The Pride of Brazil 
 The incipient stages of the Brazilian aerospace industry can be traced back to the 
“eccentric bon vivant”(van Agtmael, 2007, p.171) Santos Dumont, who was an early 
innovator in motorized airships. In fact, Brazilians often discredit the Wright brothers as 
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the first in flight and cite Santos Dumont’s dirigibles as the landmark achievement. 
Regardless of how history should be remembered, Dumont’s exploits inspired a 
generation of Brazilian entrepreneurs and engineers who would attempt to establish a 
Brazilian aircraft manufacturing industry. However, without proper financial support or 
sufficient technological capabilities due to a dearth of engineers, all of the ventures failed 
to become commercially viable (Marques, 2004, p.4). It had become apparent, however, 
that more than ever a Brazilian aerospace industry could and should be developed. The 
thrust of the argument came from the economic development theory that was in vogue at 
the time that emphasized cultivating “national champions to catch up with the First 
World”(van Agtmael, 2007, p.172). This theory was furthered buttressed by influential 
military thinker General Meira Mattos who “developed a geostrategic theory of Brazil’s 
place in the world system predicated on the country’s success in achieving technological 
and industrial autonomy” (Goldstein, 2002, p.3).  Thus, Brazilian government policies 
created “ incentives for increasing foreign direct investment, building up industrial 
sectors in order to be self sufficient, and creating government owned firms in strategic 
areas” (Marques, 2004, p.1). In 1946 the Brazilian Aeronautics Ministry, itself 
established in 1941, took a critical, and up to that point one of the few, steps towards 
forming an aeronautics industry when it established the Aeronautical Technical Center 
(CTA). The hope was that the CTA would be able to produce enough engineers and 
technicians to help jumpstart the industry. Shortly thereafter the CTA established the 
Aeronautic Technical Institute (ITA), modeled after the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, with the hopes of training elite engineers. In 1964 the Ministry of 
Aeronautics commissioned the Brazilian Research and Development Institute (IPD) to 
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research the feasibility of creating twin-engine turboprop airliners in Brazil, with the aim 
to, “design a modern and simple airplane to be produced in series in Brazil… and provide 
the Air Force with a versatile aircraft that fulfilled the Brazilian conditions”(de Mattos, 
2006, p.27). After 4 years of development and manufacturing, the IPD-6504’s maiden 
voyage was a huge success. Recognizing the opportunity to commercialize the 
Bandeirante (the name given to the IPD-6504 when it was transferred to CTA control) the 
Ministry of Aeronautics founded Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A (Embraer) in 
1969. The initial purpose of the company was “producing the Bandeirante on an 
industrial scale, based on a 80-unit launch order from the Air Force”(Frischtak, 1992, 
p.8-9).  The first president of the company was Ozires Silva whose “objective was to 
combine state-owned enterprise resources… with the entrepreneurial agility of a private 
sector firm” (Ghemawat et. al; 2009, p.2). Although the managerial deftness of Silva and 
Embraer’s executive team were certainly an asset for the company, the protection 
afforded to Embraer by the government was key. Among other policies “Embraer was 
exempted from paying taxes and duties on imported raw materials, parts, components, 
and equipment not available locally”, the government also “permitted Brazilian 
corporations to invest up to 1% of the income tax they owed… in Embraer shares” 
(Ramamurti, 1990, p.609). Although these shares were non-voting, the tax scheme still 
“helped Embraer raise an estimated $350 million in capital between 1970 and 1985” 
(Ghemawat et. al, 2009, p.2). This was not the only way the Brazilian government 
supported its nascent aerospace industry, as a steady stream of government procurement 
kept both production and capital flowing into the company. The government’s assistance 
was crucial for the company’s success as “the process of capital availability in the 
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sector… permit[ted] the company to finance R&D programs, transforming Embraer into 
a dynamic centre of industry”(Bernardes, 2003, p.6). The steps taken by the Brazilian 
government were in line with the development theory dogma at the time and initially 
proved wildly successful. 
  To more holistically understand the significance of the government’s support, it 
is useful to examine both the relationship between Embraer and the government more 
deeply and the system of innovation it created. Fundamentally, one of the most important 
steps for the company’s success was its early emphasis on innovation. The civil aircraft 
market is extremely dynamic and requires a robust system of innovation in order to 
promote the technological capabilities required to compete. The development of the 
capabilities that make a system effective “depend[s] on the interplay of incentives, 
capabilities, and institutions”(Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010,p.1). Thus, while tax schemes 
and trade barriers were important for Embraer to compete commercially, they were not 
the exclusive means of government support.  Instead, the government also provided 
critical support in developing a potent system of innovation through fostering R&D and 
technology and knowledge transfers. In addition to the “learning by doing”, Embraer, by 
way of the Ministry of Defense, “ used licensing and co-operation agreements to bring 
new resources and knowledge into the firm and develop a strong core competence –
system engineering for producing aircraft”(Goldstein, 2002, p.11) In summation, on top 
of the protective barriers, favorable tax schemes, and government procurement, Embraer 
received crucial assistance from the government in fostering an effective innovation 
system. The Ministry of Aeronautics and the Ministry of Defense heavily funded the 
CTA, ITA, and IPD; and it supported the company in technology transfers through aiding 
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in foreign partnerships. What is more, the Brazilian government strategically hung the 
threat of tariffs over the head of other countries and companies to push them towards 
favorable technology transfers for Embraer. During the 1970s, due in part to the domestic 
monopoly the company enjoyed2 and the ample government support it received, Embraer 
experienced a decade of remarkable success. Embraer’s success was particularly 
noteworthy, as it did not simply weather the storm of the global oil- shock, it boomed. 
Bombardier Aerospace 
 In line with its bitter strategic rival, and the rest of the civil aircraft manufacturing 
industry for that matter, the Canadian aerospace firm Bombardier has benefitted from 
healthy doses of government support throughout its history. In comparison with its 
Brazilian counterpart, however, government aid is one of the few commonalities the 
company’s share (aside from producing world-class regional jets of course). For its part, 
Bombardier was a private company from its inception, was not founded for the sole 
purpose of creating a national champion in aerospace, and has thrived on diversification. 
From its humble beginnings in 1942 as a small snowmobile manufacturer in rural 
Quebec, Bombardier has successfully expanded to become one of the largest producers of 
mass transportation equipment and third largest aerospace manufacturer in the world. 
 From a distance, the development of Bombardier seems rather straightforward, as 
profits from the success in one market would fuel the development of a competitive 
product in the company’s next venture. The actual fuel for the company’s meteoric rise 
came from the bold risk-taking of its leaders and timely government support. Where 
others balked, Bombardier (and the Canadian government) saw real opportunity for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This monopoly was created by both the “Law of the Similars”, which dictated that government agencies 
could not purchase foreign products if there was an Embraer model that was less than 15% more expensive, 
and the high tariffs on imported aircraft. 
	   11	  
growth and during the second half of the 20th century steadily became one of the largest 
companies in Canada.  Far from its current status as a giant multinational conglomerate 
and symbol of national pride for Canada, Bombardier began on a practical invention to 
transport people efficiently during the tough Quebec winters.  After a few decades of 
success with commercial snowmobiles and tractors the company shifted gears again with 
its new invention, a recreational snowmobile called the Ski-Doo. The Ski-Doo would 
thrive on the boom of recreational spending during the 1960s. It would also represent the 
last invention of the company’s ingenious founder as Armand Bombardier passed away 
shortly after the Ski-Doo’s launch and his stepson, Laurent Beaudoin, would take the 
reins. With Beaudoin at the helm the company was no longer hamstrung by the cautious 
business approach of its founder and would burgeon under Beaudoin’s daring leadership. 
 In Beaudoin’s mind the overall similarity of the company’s products exposed it to 
unnecessary risk. A mild winter, an increase in gas prices, or a contraction in consumer’s 
discretionary spending would be quite detrimental to the company. The new CEO’s idea 
was to diversify as quickly as possible. One of the first opportunities the company 
received was a contract for Montreal subway cars. The city was looking to expand its 
public transportation system, Montreal Métro, in preparation for the 1976 Olympics and 
approached Bombardier to make a competing bid against Canadian Vickers. It is likely 
that Bombardier was initially approached, and eventually won, because of “growing 
political nationalism in French Quebec”(Hadekel 2004, p.42).  Rather than let Vickers 
(an English speaking British company) continue to dominate mass-transit in Quebec, 
officials in Montreal encouraged and later contracted Bombardier, a French speaking 
company, to try its hands at mass transit. Vickers cried foul as they “not only had the 
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lowest bid, [they] had the experience, the know-how, and the trained personnel”(Hadekel 
2004, p.44). Though the Montreal Métro contract proved to be quite a windfall, the 
company scuffled for a number of years losing bids on other mass transit projects in 
Ontario and Quebec City to Hawker Siddeley and the Canadian division of General 
Motors respectively.  
 Bombardier’s luck would change quite dramatically when New York City opened 
up bidding for a new contract to replace their dilapidated rail cars in 1981. Competition 
for the contract was quite stiff with all bidders offering quality products at similar prices. 
The bid “was going to come down to financing: who could loan the most money to the 
MTA at the best terms” (Hadekel 2004, p.58). Fortunately for Bombardier, the Export 
Development Corporation (EDC), a federal program that lent at below market rates to 
foreign buyers of Canadian goods, was beginning to aggressively support Canadian 
companies after an impasse in OECD negotiations. In the end the EDC, and by extension 
the Canadian government, loaned New York, “$536 million U.S. at the rate of 9.7%” as 
well as providing a $225 million performance bond (Hadekel 60, p.2004). Although not 
the first time the EDC supported Bombardier, this was by far the largest aid to date and 
the 9.7% interest rate was well below the OECD standard of 11.25%. For Bombardier 
this was a major victory that, along with a few other EDC supported deals, vaulted them 
to the lead of the mass-transit market. While Bombardier had certainly been a savvy and 
aggressive company, their success was in large part due to the generous support of the 
EDC. As Bombardier looked to shift into another market and further diversify their risk, 
the EDC was more than willing to bankroll some of the company’s riskiest endeavors.  
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 Looking to expand Bombardier’s horizons, Beaudoin somewhat stumbled into the 
aerospace industry when he was approached about purchasing the Montreal based 
aerospace firm Canadair. Canadair’s best years were seemingly behind it as the company 
had gone from a successful private firm to a languishing public enterprise that was kept 
afloat by hefty government support. The government’s ownership of Canadair was 
untenable due to the enormous losses Canadair was suffering, but the Canadian 
government did not wish to give up on what it viewed as a critical high-tech industry. 
After it wrote down the company’s sizeable debt, the government announced it was 
looking to privatize Canadair. Of the companies that bid on Canadair, Bombardier had a 
considerable advantage in that it was based in Quebec and was the most likely bidder to 
keep jobs in the province. In 1986 the Canadian government sold Canadair for $123 
million to Bombardier, a deal many criticized as a steal for Bombardier considering 
Canadair was worth nearly twice that (MacDonald 2001, p.136).  What was most 
attractive about Canadair was that with its debt wiped clean by the government, the 
company possessed a couple of competitive products in growth segments. In particular, 
Canadair’s Challenger business jet would be a major boon for the company during the 
late 1980s economic revival in the United States (the Challenger’s largest market).  
 Despite the company’s all-around success, Bombardier suffered a public image 
problem as many Canadians felt the company unfairly benefitted from government 
largesse. This common perception would continue during Bombardier’s next venture, the 
regional jet. When the United States de-regulated the airline industry in 1978 the major 
carriers developed what is known as the hub and spoke model. In this system airlines 
choose a major city to be their headquarters (the hub) and then provide service to other 
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major cities (the spokes). While the hub and spoke system was most efficient for airlines, 
it was not well liked by consumers, “it added time, length, and inconvenience to the 
journey” (Hadekel 2004, p.113). If Bombardier could develop a mid-sized jet that could 
fly further than the turboprops that plied the shorter routes in the hub and spoke system, 
airlines could serve a wider range of customer’s conveniently. Developing an original 
plane from scratch would be extremely risky and nearly impossible without government 
support. Bombardier, however, did not have to reinvent the wheel like other potential 
regional aircraft manufactures. Instead, the company could simply stretch the successful 
Challenger jet to serve approximately 50 passengers. Not only would modifying an 
existing jet save Bombardier money, the time saved on development would afford 
Bombardier significant first-mover advantages. Even with the reduced costs and the 
temporarily uncontested market Bombardier would enjoy, “the additional investment 
required for the regional jet was $350 million… this sum represented more than half of 
the shareholders equity”(Hadekel 2004, p.118). Bombardier thus decided to ask for $100 
million from the Defense Industry Productivity Program (DIPP), a government fund to 
support R&D in critical, defense related technologies. Government aid was not confined 
to the development process, as the EDC would step in to finance the sale of Bombardiers 
jets when private lenders balked at the risk. The EDC’s aid would prove critical, as 
Bombardier’s regional jet program did not have an auspicious start. Early sales for the 
Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ) stagnated during the recession of the early 1990s. The main 
targets for the CRJs were the regional airlines that had become strapped for cash during 
the economic downturn. Luckily for Bombardier the EDC was more than willing to 
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assume the risk for the sales of the CRJ, and Bombardier’s most successful program took 
off as the U.S. economy rebounded strongly in the mid 1990s. 
 In Canada, the government did not found the aerospace industry, nor did a single 
firm like its Brazilian counterpart dominate it from the beginning. This is not to say, 
however, that the Canadian aerospace industry was not the beneficiary of any 
government support. Among these incentives were large R&D and export subsidies, tax 
breaks, and public procurement. For Bombardier, the DIPP and the EDC were the most 
consistent ways to obtain public support to help cover its development costs. The DIPP 
was started in 1959 and its subsidies “increased from C$2 million a year to some C$43 
million in 1989 for the development of the fifty-seat Canadian regional jet by 
Bombardier” (Niosi 2005, p.65). Bombardier also benefitted from generous financing 
support for its export sales from the EDC. In fact, “between 1996 and 2003, [the EDC] 
financed some C$8 billion, or 40% of Bombardier’s overseas aircraft sales”(Niosi 2005, 
p.65). Additionally, the federal government was not the aerospace industry’s only 
benefactor; Quebec’s provincial government offered hefty support to the industry as well. 
The Quebec government “contributes to aerospace innovation through its tax credit for 
R&D system” and helped found a university/industry aerospace research center in 
Montreal (Niosi 2005, p.65-66).  
 Overall, the two companies relied heavily on aid from their respective 
governments and both focused on assembling aircraft while depending on a system of 
risk-sharing partners and small suppliers. Bombardier, however, is distinct in that its 
initial purpose was not to create a domestic aerospace industry. Moreover, the difference 
between the countries’ strategies is quite clear. As a developing country Brazil attempted 
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to incubate a number of high-technology firms to catch up with the developed world. In 
contrast to the more centrally planned Brazilian economy, Canada, as a developed 
country, has the luxury of supporting existing firms that innovate and succeed on their 
own. Therefore, while Embraer’s success is due to planning and consistent support, 
Bombardier’s has succeeded in a somewhat more organic fashion. 
A WTO Dispute Devolves into a Trade War 
 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 created the lucrative niche market that both 
Embraer and Bombardier would exploit during the 1990s. As mentioned above, the hub 
and spoke system, although efficient for airlines, was rather inconvenient for passengers. 
Customers, and therefore airlines, craved an aircraft smaller than the wide-bodied jets 
that dominated cross-country travel, but was still large enough for point-to-point travel 
and could therefore cut down on layovers. Up until that point, however, smaller airplanes 
were not powered by jet engine and instead were exclusively turboprop aircraft. There 
was something so unsettling about the noise and vibration of propeller driven airplanes 
that customers would forgo the time saved by the point-to-point routes that turboprops 
plied in favor of the time-consuming hub and spoke system routes that jet engine aircraft 
traveled (Goldstein, 2002, p.104). Embraer and Bombardier both recognized the 
opportunity of developing a mid-sized (or regional) jet and would profit immensely from 
stretching their successful business jets to seat approximately 50 passengers. With 
significant help from the EDC, Bombardier was first to the market when it introduced the 
CRJ-100 in 1991. However, on top of the mammoth development costs for a regional jet 
came the problem of financing the sale of these aircraft to airlines. As Peter Hadekel 
wryly points out, unlike the business jet market, the regional jet’s clientele “wasn’t the 
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champagne and Gucci shoes crowd, it was the brown-bag and white-sneaker 
market”(Hadekel, 2004, p.175,). Consequently, even though there was sizeable demand 
for regional jets, “when the regional jet revolution was introduced by Bombardier in the 
early 1990s, nobody was quite sure how the financing would work”(Hadekel,2004, p. 
175,).  Fortunately for Bombardier and Embraer, their respective governments stepped in 
to fill the breach. In fact, since “Bombardier and Embraer developed products that 
differed little in basic performance and design” (Lawton and McGuire, 2001, p.222) the 
competition between the CRJ-100 and the ERJ-145 came down to which government 
could offer the most favorable financing.  
 The Programa de Finaciamento às Exportações (ProEX) was Brazil’s response to 
the hefty support Bombardier received from the TPC (Technology Partnership Canada) 
and EDC. Basically, “whatever the interest rate attached to the loan, the program allowed 
the Brazilian government to pay 3.8 percentage points”(Lawton and McGuire, 2001, 
p.223). Brazil would later argue at the WTO that the subsidy was meant to counteract 
what it termed “Brazil risk”, the steeper interest rates Brazilian companies faced in global 
markets due to their national origin, however, the subsidy effectively meant that Embraer 
could enter a bidding war with the backing of the Brazilian government. 
 A ProEx-backed Embraer first struck at Bombardier’s market dominance when it 
won an order to produce 25 ERJ’s for Continental Airlines with options to build over 100 
in the future. Shortly thereafter, Embraer bagged another big order, this time with 
American Eagle (an American Airlines subsidiary), for 42 ERJ’s (Hadekel, 2004, p.193-
194,). These two orders combined to completely erode Bombardier’s first-mover 
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advantage and its majority share in the regional jet market. Given the amount of money 
already sunk in to Bombardier’s regional jet project and the strategic value placed on the 
aerospace industry, the Canadian government was not going to allow its aerospace 
darling to be outcompeted without a fight. The first tool Bombardier used to fight back 
was to convince the government of Quebec “to create a $450 million pool of equity 
guarantees that could be used to finance future sales of [regional jets]”(Hadekel, 2004, 
p.197). This, of course, meant Canada was furthering the subsidy competition at the 
expense of its taxpayer. The second means of recourse Canada took to combat Brazil’s 
ProEx was filing suit at the WTO. 
 In the summer of 1996 Canada requested consultations (DS-46) with Brazil on the 
grounds that ProEx violated Articles 3, 27.4, and 27.53 of the WTO agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) (Barral, 2007, p.30). Although 
negotiations between the two sides were initially productive, it became increasingly 
obvious as the months wore on that this case would have to go before a dispute panel. It 
also became increasingly obvious to Brazil that if it lost the WTO case Embraer would be 
at a severe disadvantage without ProEx support. Consequently, Brazil filed its own suit at 
the WTO (DS-70) requesting consultation with Canada in March of 1997. Negotiations in 
both cases, unsurprisingly, became extremely unproductive as 1997 wore on and dispute 
panels were established for both suits on July 23rd, 1998. The Dispute Panel for DS-46 
issued its report on April 14th 1999 and “found that the Brazilian measures were 
inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 27.4 of the Subsidies Agreement”(Barral, 2007, 
p.30). In DS-70, the Panel found that certain Canadian measures violated Articles 3.1(a) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Article 3 of the ASCM declares that export subsidies are prohibited. Articles 27.4 and 27.5 deal with the 
exception granted to developing countries for export subsidies (27.4) and their eventual phase-out (27.5). 
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and 3.2 of the ASCM, “but rejected Brazil’s claim that EDC assistance to the Canadian 
regional aircraft industry constitute[ed] export subsidies” (Barral,2007, p.33). Brazil and 
Canada both appealed the Panel reports but the Appellate Body upheld each of the 
Panel’s findings. 
 With the EDC’s legality largely confirmed by the WTO, the first round of this 
subsidy feud was a clear victory for Bombardier. Nevertheless, Canada as a whole did not 
come out unscathed as the “dispute had already taken its toll on trade diplomacy, dashing 
Canada’s hopes of signing a free trade pact with MERCOSUR” (Hadekel, 2004, p.200-
201). Brazil, on the other hand, had come out unambiguously worse for the wear from its 
tussle at the WTO. Not only had its claim against the EDC failed but also ProEx, the very 
program that vaulted Embraer into the regional jet market, had been deemed illegal. If 
Brazil was going to keep Embraer afloat it would have to come up with a new finance 
program that was as competitive as the EDC and was WTO compliant. Luckily for 
Brazil, WTO compliance requirements are not automatically enforced and thus, “part of 
the Brazilian strategy was simply to stall…so its export financing scheme could 
continue”(Hadekel,2004, p.205). The first step of Brazil’s stalling strategy was to appeal 
the Panel’s decision. As mentioned above, however, the Appellate Body upheld the 
Panel’s ruling on ProEx. The onus was now on Brazil to take meaningful action on 
modifying its export-financing scheme. Recognizing that another round of compliance 
proceedings might buy a bit of time, Brazil “made only cosmetic changes to the 
program”(Hadekel, 2004, p.205). Stalling was less successful than Brazil thought it 
would be, though, as a compliance panel was established less than a year later in July 
2000. The compliance panel ruled that ProEx II (a name given by the WTO to distinguish 
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between the original ProEx and the modified version) was non-compliant and granted 
Canada with C$344.2 million worth of countervailing measures. Given that the 
countervailing measures are damaging to both the injurer and the complainant in a WTO 
case4, Brazil knew that Canada was unlikely to enact its countervailing measures.  Brazil 
therefore rolled the dice on another slightly modified iteration of ProEx (this time called 
ProEx III) that was deemed legal on the seemingly slimmest of margins. The WTO’s 
compliance panel ruled “it is legally possible for Brazil to operate ProEx III in such a 
way that it does not result in a benefit being conferred upon producers of regional 
aircraft” (Froese, 2010, p.88).  With ProEx III granted legal clearance by the skin of its 
teeth, the second round of Brazil and Canada’s WTO battle certainly went to Brazil. 
Armed with a WTO sanctioned ProEx, Embraer continued to encroach on Bombardier’s 
market share as it bagged huge deals with Cross Air, Continental Airlines, and American 
Airlines.  
 As the contracts for ERJs rolled in the pressure on Ottawa to fight back mounted. 
The Canadian government’s options were seemingly limited to rolling out another 
subsidy program since enacting WTO sanctioned countermeasures “wasn’t an attractive 
option because the measures would have hurt Canadian consumers and done nothing to 
penalize Embraer”(Hadekel, 2004, p.209). Canada therefore decided to fight fire with fire 
by equaling Brazil’s subsidy program. Matching a subsidy program was an 
unprecedented move in a WTO dispute and was on dubious legal grounds since it was not 
sanctioned by WTO law. Though acting outside of WTO precedent, Canada felt the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The suspension of WTO concessions permits the complainant to rescind the extension of the most-
favored-nation status to the violator by implementing tariffs up to the value of the award. However, 
fundamental theories of trade point out that tariffs are just as damaging to their enactor as they raise prices 
for consumers and create economic inefficiencies.  
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OECD Arrangement on export credits justified its actions. The OECD Arrangement sets 
minimum interest rate levels (known as commercial interest reference rates (CIRR)) and 
allows governments to offer rates below the CIRR only if another government oversteps 
the CIRR threshold first. In other words, Canada contended, “if another government 
export credit agency offered a rate below the CIRRs, it was allowed to match that 
derogation”(Krikorian, 2012, p.178). Canada’s new policy was first used when Air 
Wisconsin announced it was in the market for a large order of regional jets. Embraer’s 
financial package for Air Wisconsin was better than Bombardier’s initial offer, but when 
Bombardier secured Ottawa’s guarantee to match the Brazilian interest rates, Air 
Wisconsin pounced. Recognizing that their mega-deal with Air Wisconsin would 
certainly be challenged at the WTO, Bombardier insisted that Air Wisconsin sign a letter 
stating Bombardier’s offer was no more favorable than Embraer’s and consequently 
compliant with the OECD Arrangement on export credits (Hadekel, 2004, 210). Brazil 
immediately filed suit at the WTO (DS-222) and this time around Canada and Brazil’s 
WTO dispute over aircraft would remain anything but civil.  
 In response to Brazil filing suit, the Canadian government imposed a ban on 
importing Brazilian beef, citing bogus concerns over mad-cow disease (Hadekel, 2004, 
212). Brazil erupted into protests, a boycott of Canadian products was called for, and 
Brazilian students delivered a live cow to the Canadian embassy and snidely invited the 
diplomats out for a barbeque (CBC News, 2001). The furor in Brazil was not unfounded 
since the United States and Mexico were obliged to follow their NAFTA partner’s lead 
and ban Brazilian beef imports as well (Jack, 2001). In Geneva, Canada’s argument that 
it was following OECD guidelines fell on deaf ears and the Canadian government was 
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ordered to modify how the EDC supported aircraft financing. After the 90-day 
compliance window, Canada informed the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that it simply 
would not reform EDC financing of the Air Wisconsin deal. The DSB’s arbitrators 
awarded Brazil the right to suspend concessions and “in order to secure compliance by 
Canada they added a 20% adjustment” to the award’s total (Shadikhodjaev, 2009, p.148). 
Given the doubly injurious nature of suspending concessions, in the end Brazil opted to 
not enact its countervailing measures either. 
 Roughly seven years after Canada first requested consultations, the dispute over 
subsidizing regional aircraft had accomplished nothing. In fact, it would appear as though 
the WTO cases had only made matters worse. The diplomatic tensions that spilled over 
from Bombardier and Embraer’s competition shattered a free trade deal and initiated a 
petty and ruinous trade war over beef. The dispute also cost the two countries millions in 
legal fees and forced each side to only slightly modify their jointly suboptimal subsidy 
program. While the feud was finally resolved nearly a decade after its start5, the length 
and animosity of this case are confounding given how costly the ordeal was in both 
diplomatic and economic terms. The subsequent sections will try to establish how 
economically damaging the dispute was before turning to an examination of the political 
factors that prevented a more timely resolution of the dispute. 
Strategic Trade Policy 
 A useful starting point for a discussion on strategic trade policy and trade disputes 
is the model developed by Marc Busch in his 1999 book Trade Warriors. Busch’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The two countries finally came to an understanding by signing the 2007 OECD Aircraft Sector 
Understanding 
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approach is more political science oriented and is therefore a good introduction to the 
more technical models developed by Brander and Spencer(1985). In his examination of 
why governments intervene on the behalf of high-technology firms, Busch highlights a 
few explanations that have been mentioned above, for example, a concern for path 
dependence and national pride. Busch also introduces two new factors that he terms the 
consumption and internalization variables. The consumption variable depends on whether 
“industries upstream or downstream are in place to anchor the relevant linkage 
externalities”(Busch, 1999, p.16). For the internalization variable “ the intuition behind 
this variable is that states are likely to be reluctant to subsidize a national champion if the 
externalities that result help foreign firms as much as they do domestic ones”(Busch, 
1999, p.16). According to Busch, not only do these variables determine if a country 
supports a high-tech industry, they are also essential to a state’s calculus in deciding to 
engage in a trade war, overall “states weigh the expected benefits from intervention 
against the potential costs of initiating a trade war”(Busch, 1999, p.4). Therefore, the 
greater the ability of a country to consume and internalize the externalities from a high-
tech industry, the more likely it is to support the industry in the face of a trade war. The 
net result of these interventions is the kind of “Beggar-Thy-Neighbor” policy games that 
are jointly suboptimal. Busch models this in the following pay-off table. 
                     State B 
State A 
No intervention Limited intervention Full intervention 
No intervention 7,7 2, 8 1, 9 
Limited intervention 8, 2 6, 6 4, 7 
Full intervention 9, 1 7, 4 5, 5 
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With the option for no intervention, limited intervention, and full intervention, both states 
will opt for full intervention if they can consume and internalize and both states will be 
worse off. Busch concludes that in this scenario an agreement to limit subsidies would be 
mutually beneficial. 
 In the economic literature on strategic trade policy the work of Barbara Spencer 
and James Brander on export subsidies is seminal. Among the most cited authors in the 
sub discipline, their 1985 paper “Export Subsidies and International Market Share 
Rivalry” is particularly relevant to high-tech industries like aerospace. The basis for their 
paper is a strategic relationship between two firms (one foreign, one domestic) competing 
in an imperfectly competitive market. In a strategic relationship “the payoffs (profits) of 
one firm must be directly affected by the individual strategy choices of other firms, and 
this must be understood by the firms themselves”(Brander, 1995, p.1397). The key to 
their model is that the governments of the two firms also recognize this strategic 
relationship and perceive their companies (and therefore themselves) to be in competition 
for international market share. Given the imperfectly competitive market that the two 
firms are competing in, the two governments will see subsidies as “attractive policy tools 
as they improve the relative position of the domestic firm…enabling it to expand market 
share and earn greater profits”(Brander and Spencer, 1985, p.1). Although subsidization 
will have a negative terms of trade6 impact on the country, the increased profit of the 
domestic firm will result in a net societal benefit. The relationship between the four 
actors in this scenario, the two firms and the two governments, can be characterized as 
“firms play Nash against all other players, and governments play Stackleberg against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Terms of trade is the ratio of the value of a country’s exports to the value of its imports. Thus, if a subsidy 
reduces the price of an export it is diminishing the country’s terms of trade.	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firms and Nash against other governments”(Brander and Spencer, 1985, p.84). Of course, 
precisely because the two governments play Nash against each other, the unilateral 
incentive for governments to subsidize results in a jointly suboptimal subsidy 
competition. To be certain, if the domestic government were to subsidize its firm while 
the foreign government remained idle, the marginal cost of the domestic firm would 
decrease and allow for an increase in production that benefits domestic welfare at the 
expense of foreign. As Brander and Spencer conclude  
“the optimal subsidy moves the industry equilibrium to what would, in the absence of a 
subsidy, be the Stackelberg leader-follower position in output space with the domestic 
firm as leader” (Brander and Spencer, 1985, p.89). 
 
However, since both governments have similar incentives there is no reason to think that 
the foreign government would not enact the same subsidy program. While consumers of 
the good would benefit from expanded output and consequently lower prices, “joint 
welfare of the producing nations would rise if the subsidy levels were reduced”(Brander 
and Spencer, 1995, 95). Although maintaining free trade from the beginning would have 
been ideal, “neither country can risk unilateral free trade because the other might then 
follow the Brander-Spencer policy”(Pomfret 1992, 18). The conclusions of the Brander 
and Spencer model can be visualized in the following graphic7. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Sheldon, I. Imperfect Competition and Trade Policy. AEDE 6200: "International Economics and Policy" 
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The two axes in this graphic represent the output of each firm; the higher the equilibrium 
is on the firm’s axis, the more it produces. Since this is modeling a strategic relationship 
between two firms, the firms choose the quantity of their output based their rival’s output.  
This is modeled by the two reaction functions (labeled RF1 and RF2), and in the absence 
of government intervention the reaction functions meet at the Cornout equilibrium 
labeled CS. When a firm is subsidized it is able to expand its output beyond the Cornout 
equilibrium and therefore the two dashed lines (labeled RF’1 and RF’2) represent the 
reaction functions of the firms when they receive government subsidies. In the absence of 
government intervention for the foreign firm, domestic firms expand production and the 
equilibrium moves to either S1 or S2, the Stackelberg leader position. In this scenario the 
expanded output results in an increase in domestic welfare as the increase in profit 
outweighs the negative terms of trade effects and the cost of the subsidy. Conversely, at 
the Stackelberg equilibrium the domestic firm’s expanded output comes at the expense of 
the foreign firm’s output. With a dip in output, and therefore profits, foreign welfare is 
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diminished. However, when both governments subsidize their firms the market moves to 
Nash equilibrium N. At the Nash equilibrium both firms produce more than at the 
Cournot equilibrium but their profits have actually decreased because of the reduction in 
prices brought on by the subsidies. The downward shift of the iso-profit lines (from π1 
and π2 to π1’ and π2’) demonstrate this decrease in profit. This subsidy competition is 
damaging beyond just firm profits, however, as the reduction in price has worsened each 
country’s terms of trade. In essence, the subsidies are only beneficial to world consumers 
as the reduction in prices allows for increased consumption and the two producing 
nations would benefit from an agreement to limit their subsidy programs.  
 Given the intense rivalries between Airbus and Boeing, and Bombardier and 
Embraer, the civil aircraft market is one of the best examples of a strategic relationship in 
an imperfectly competitive international market. As Irwin and Pavcnik conclude,  
The aircraft sector provides a textbook example of an industry in which trade policy 
could affect the strategic interaction between a domestic and an international rival and 
shift profits in favor of the domestic firm as proposed in Brander and Spencer’s (1985) 
canonical model of strategic trade policy (2003, 3). 
 
To date, a number of studies have been conducted applying strategic trade models to the 
civil aircraft market. Richard Baldwin and Paul Krugman conducted one of the most 
important studies on the strategic rivalry between Airbus (a consortium of EU members) 
and Boeing (United States) and their respective governments in 1988. In their study 
Baldwin and Krugman create a model to simulate the entry of a subsidized firm (Airbus) 
to a market that was previously a monopoly. Though detrimental to the United States, the 
entry of Airbus was shown to increase global consumer welfare by way of decreasing 
unit price. Another relevant study was conducted by Douglas Irwin and Nina Pavcnik and 
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focuses on the impact of the 1992 U.S.- E.U. Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft. Their 
findings are in line with Brander and Spencer’s conclusion that an agreement to limit 
export subsidies will be mutually beneficial as their model finds a 3.7% increase in 
aircraft prices after the accord was struck8.  Finally, Richard Baldwin and Harry Flam’s 
1989 paper on the market for 30-40 seat commuter aircraft is particularly relevant to the 
dispute examined in this paper. The market Baldwin and Flam simulate is the antecedent 
of the polemical 50-seat aircraft market in the 1990s, although it features one more firm 
(Sweden’s Saab) than the bitter Embraer and Bombardier dispute.  Baldwin and Flam’s 
conclusions are similar to that of Baldwin and Krugman’s in that they find the subsidies 
are “quite effective in shifting profits away from the foreign and to the domestic firm” 
and lower world price while increasing consumer welfare (Baldwin and Flam 1989, 498). 
Baldwin and Flam, however, do not study the equilibrium effects of strategic trade policy 
in the 30-40-seat market and therefore make no conclusions about net societal welfare. 
The next section will examine the equilibrium impacts of Canada and Brazil’s sizeable 
subsidy program. 
Simulating Strategic Intervention in the Regional Jet Market 
 With high cost of entry, an imperfectly competitive market, and governments 
willing to subsidize their domestic firm, the regional jet rivalry presents an excellent 
opportunity to study the equilibrium impacts of strategic government intervention. Since 
the rivalry between Embraer and Bombardier nearly perfectly reflects the scenarios 
outlined by Busch and Brander and Spencer, I expect the effect of the two government’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The 3.7% price increase represents a terms of trade gain for both countries that is larger than the decrease 
in consumer surplus. 
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subsidization program to be very similar to those described in both papers. To simulate 
the subsidy programs of Brazil and Canada I borrow a static equilibrium model from Dr. 
Sheldon9. In line with the strategic relationship described by Brander and Spencer, 
demand, and therefore output, is a function of the prices of the two products. The profit 
functions for the two firms are as follows 
π1=(p1−c1)q1 
π2=(p2−c2)q2 
 
Where π1 and π2 are Bombardier and Embraer’s profits respectively and p, c, and q are 
price, cost, and quantity for their corresponding firms. The market equilibrium for the 
two firms is derived as  𝑑𝑄!𝑑𝑄! =   1∆    (𝑏! + 𝜆!) −𝑘−𝑘 (𝑏! + 𝜆! −𝑑𝑐!−𝑑𝑐!  
The middle matrix represents the responsiveness of how much the two firms supply to 
changes in their rival’s quantity supplied, while the far right matrix is the impact of the 
subsidies on Bombardier and Embraer’s production. Although the simulation of the 
regional jet market using Dr. Sheldon’s model will provide a rough estimate for the 
impacts of subsidization, there are two flaws with this approach. First, the model used 
analyzes a static equilibrium even though the market for regional jets is quite volatile. 
Aircraft orders tend to come in bunches and from year to year total orders can fluctuate 
drastically. Furthermore, demand for regional jets is extremely sensitive to global 
macroeconomic trends. Consequently, the change in the number of orders a firm receives 
year to year could have just as much to do with a global recession as it does with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Sheldon,	  Ian	  and	  McCorriston,	  Steve.	  “Climate	  Policy	  and	  Border	  Measures:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  US	  Aluminum	  Industry”	  2015.	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government support a firm’s competitor receives. The second problem with my 
simulation are the data. Finding reliable data for the number of orders each firms 
receives, the price of a jet, and the subsidy levels was extremely difficult since pricing 
data is considered a trade secret and governments are quite reluctant to release 
information about a subsidy program that has been deemed illegal. As a result, my 
simulation of the regional jet market would fair poorly if it were subjected to sensitivity 
analysis and should not be interpreted as a conclusive result. Instead, this exercise should 
be interpreted as a general simulation that applies widely accepted theory to an 
undeniably imperfectly competitive market. The quantity and pricing information comes 
from The Airline Monitor10 (Greenslet, May 2007). Subsidy levels from the two 
governments were even more difficult to come by as all of these numbers were struck 
from publicly released WTO documents. The final subsidy number for Brazil was taken 
from an estimate by Bombardier CEO Bob Brown who calculated ProEx was reducing 
the price of ERJ-145s by about 2 million (Hadekel, 2004, 194). The subsidy levels for 
Bombardier were acquired from an Embraer press release that estimates “the current 
award against Canada is close to US$ 4.0 million per subsidized aircraft” (Embraer Press 
Release, 2003). As mentioned above, for the final award the WTO tacked on an 
additional 20% of the EDC subsidy in an effort to make Canada comply (Shadikhodjaev, 
2009, p.148). This leads to a rough estimate that each plane was subsidized by about US$ 
3.3 million. These crude calculations yield the following results.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 A special thanks to Mr. Greenslet of The Airline Monitor and Dr. Taneja of OSU for granting me access 
to this data. 
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Variable* Both getting 
subsidies 
Only 
Bombardier 
subsidy 
Only Embraer 
subsidy 
No subsidies 
Bombardier profits  1797.7 1857.4 1277.9 1328.4 
Embraer profits  369.7 247.3 410.0 280.5 
Net Canadian 
welfare  
-160.2 -110.9 -50.4 0 
Net Brazilian 
welfare  
-105.9 -33.1 -75.9 0 
Consumer surplus  1913.9 1767.8 1573.4 1425.2 
Bombardier sales  190 193 160 164 
Embraer sales  97 79 102 85 
Bombardier price  16.4 16.5 18.2 18.4 
Embraer price  13.2 14.5 13.4 14.8 
*All values in $millions except sale quantities 
 
Interestingly enough, when one government subsidizes to move its firm into the 
Stackelberg leader position the program is actually welfare decreasing. This is likely 
because the two countries’ subsidy programs were so large that they outweighed any 
increase in firm profits. Moreover, when both governments choose to subsidize joint 
welfare decreases even more dramatically and the two governments would be better off 
coming to an agreement on limiting subsidies. Based on theory and the rough estimates 
provided in this paper, the subsidy programs run by the Brazilian and Canadian 
governments defied economic logic. Both governments responded to escalation with 
further subsidization. In the end, the expanded output and increased profit of the firms did 
not outweigh the tax dollars spent on the subsidization program and the terms of trade 
loss from lowered export prices. Beyond just economic logic, the two sides suffered 
appreciably in diplomatic terms as highlighted above. What becomes readily apparent, 
then, is that there was something beyond economic welfare in each government’s 
calculus to subsidize their respective firms. In the basic Brander and Spencer model 
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societal welfare is simply the profit of the firm minus the cost of the subsidy and the 
objective of the government is to increase domestic welfare. But as Brander and Spencer 
concede “there is nothing that rules out political economy objectives, such as the use of 
trade policy to reward special interest groups (SIG) that provide large donations to the 
government”(Brander and Spencer, 2008, 2). If joint subsidization flies in the face of 
economic logic, then there must be underlying political objectives that compelled Canada 
and Brazil to continue subsidizing Bombardier and Embraer and drag their heals when it 
came to complying with the WTO rulings.  
Political Economy, Ideas, and WTO Compliance 
 For all the ink that has been spilled bemoaning their reliance on soft law and a 
weak enforcement mechanism, the GATT/WTO have been remarkably effective at 
resolving disputes between trade combatants. In a survey of over 600 GATT/WTO 
disputes between 1948-1999 Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt find that nearly 55% of 
disputes are settled before the panel stage, leading to the conclusion that “settlement and 
the withdrawal of cases are thus the norm, not the exception” (Busch and Reinhardt, 
2000, p.161). Instead of a supranational enforcement authority, the WTO relies on the 
political or reputational costs of non-compliance. As Alexander Thompson points out in a 
general analysis of reputation and compliance in international law “the reputational 
benefits from compliance, or the costs of a damaged reputation from non-compliance, can 
sometimes override the short-term payoff to be gained by violation (2009, p.305). In a 
similar fashion to Busch’s blueprint for why governments support high-tech industries11, 
states theoretically weigh the benefits of non-compliance against the reputational costs of 
being seen as uncooperative. Nonetheless, in Busch’s formula states are concerned with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See quote on page 25 
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maximizing national welfare when they balance the benefits and costs of intervening on a 
firm’s behalf. As advanced in the previous section, however, Brazil and Canada’s 
subsidization policies were welfare decreasing. Moreover, the two states refused to 
compromise even with the WTO’s negotiation forum at their disposal and declined to 
comply with WTO mandates despite the reputational costs of noncompliance. The utility 
functions of the two governments must have deviated from the traditional expectation of 
only seeking to maximize welfare. 
 Often times in the study of international relations states are considered unitary 
actors with a single objective function. This process, known as “black boxing” the state, 
reduces countries to a single set of preferences that are ordered hierarchically based on 
expected payoff (Busch, 1999, 15). The results from the empirical section, however, 
tentatively call into question the appropriateness of the unitary actor paradigm in the 
Brazil vs. Canada WTO dispute. Instead, during their messy WTO dispute Brazilian and 
Canadian officials seemed to privilege interest group preferences over national welfare 
considerations. Brazil and Canada’s subsidy war was self-defeating and yet the two 
governments fought on in the name of their precious aerospace industry. Interestingly, 
flouting WTO mandates for the benefit of a large industry is not uncommon behavior. 
Analyzing the compliance decisions from nearly 100 WTO cases from 1995-2008, 
Tobias Hofmann and Soo Yeon Kim found strong empirical evidence supporting the 
claim that “delays in the implementation of WTO-recommended policies are a 
consequence of opportunistic governments trying to maximize their political support 
function by providing influential economic sectors with continued non-compliance” 
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(Hofmann and Kim, 2012, p.2). What, then, best models the decision-making behavior of 
Brazil and Canada during their WTO spat? 
 Since more classical understandings of international relations and economics with 
states as “monolithic entities” (Schropp, 2009, p.183) and elected officials as benevolent 
policy makers seeking to maximize national welfare seem unable to explain Brazil and 
Canada’s behavior in this context, I turn to more political economy oriented explanations. 
A useful starting point is endogenous protection theory, which “predicts that in response 
to increased import competition, private domestic interests will intensify their lobbying 
activity for protection”(Trefler, 1993, p.139). Domestic lobbies are better able to bring 
about their policy preferences regardless of national welfare considerations because they 
are organized, can effectively appeal directly to politicians, and can make sizeable 
campaign contributions (Grossman and Helpmann, 1995a, p.681). It is not hard to 
imagine this scenario with export subsidies in place of import protection. As we see in 
this WTO dispute, both Embraer and Bombardier were able to successfully lobby for 
more subsidy support in the face of increased export competition. The implication of this 
idea is that politicians are not welfare maximizers and are instead concerned with what 
Richard Baldwin terms their “politically realistic objective function (PROF)”(1997, p. 
287). In the PROF model politicians have a set of policy objectives they prefer, but they 
compromise their preferences in favor of re-election. Since policy is set by election 
sensitive officials trying to maximize their political support “a country’s policy stance 
reflects the relative political power of its organized special interests and also the extent of 
the government’s concern for the plight of the average voter” (Grossman and Helpmann, 
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1995b, p.668). Grossman and Helpmann develop a simple linear model of a 
government’s PROF: 𝐺   ≡   Σ!𝐶! + 𝑎𝑊 
where Ci is the campaign contribution of the lobby for industry i, W is aggregate welfare 
and a is a parameter that reflects the policy-maker’s sensitivity to the average person’s 
wellbeing relative to their “taste” for campaign contributions (Grossman and Helpmann, 
1995b, p.670). Turning to the Embraer and Bombardier case, the relative political weight 
of the two firms likely helped them secure sizeable export subsidies. Given that 
“survival-maximizing governments take the relative political importance of these 
economic sectors into consideration when deciding on whether and when to comply” 
(Hofmann and Kim, 2012, p.6) with WTO rulings, it is equally likely that the Brazilian 
and Canadian governments dug their heals in due to the political influence of Bombardier 
and Embraer. The following subsections will analyze the political importance of 
Bombardier and Embraer and how it influenced government behavior. 
 In Peter Hadekel’s history of Bombardier, Silent Partners: Taxpayers and the 
Bankrolling of Bombardier, a certain trend is quite clear; Bombardier has an outsized 
influence in Canadian politics. To put it bluntly “Bombardier’s political clout count[s] for 
a lot in Ottawa”(Hadekel, 2004, 200). In general, it is unsurprising that Bombardier 
would have so much influence in Canadian politics given that “aerospace has been the 
backbone of central Canadian manufacturing, employing approximately 80,000 workers” 
(Froese, 2010, p.83 and that “Bombardier [is] one of the largest corporate donors to the 
Liberal party”(Goldstein and McGuire, 2004, p.557). What is rather impressive, however, 
is how easy it was for Bombardier to steer policy decisions during the WTO dispute. 
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Hadekel notes on multiple occasions how the CEO of Bombardier, Bob Brown, could 
simply pick up the phone and convince Canadian Cabinet Ministers that without more 
support Bombardier, and therefore the aerospace industry, would crumble. In fact, the 
director of financial and economic analysis at Industry Canada, which was responsible 
for the DIPP, noted “a strong political pressure to grant loans to aerospace”(Hadekel, 
2004, p.161). What is more, the TPC, which replaced the DIPP after that program came 
under intense public scrutiny, “was the result of a lot of lobbying” by the aerospace 
industry (Hadekel, 2004, p.167). Beyond just its economic importance, though, 
Bombardier derives influence from regional politics. As a large company in Quebec, 
Bombardier has always served as a buffer between Ottawa and the separatist movement 
in Quebec. Investing in Bombardier has consistently been a safe bet as a strong aerospace 
sector bolsters the Quebec economy and therefore quells separatist tensions. In fact, 
during the 1995 referendum for Quebec independence, Laurent Beaudoin was one of the 
most active supporters of remaining a part of Canada. As Hadekel underscores, many 
Canadians were suspicious that this was the price Beaudoin was paying for all the export 
support and Canadian intransigence during the WTO spat was the government returning 
the favor. 
 While Bombardier seems to have untold influence in Canada, Embraer certainly 
“does not lack for political sway” (Goldstein and McGuire, 2004, p.556). Before Brazil 
transitioned to a democracy, military rule certainly treated Embraer kindly. As a 
subsidiary of Brazil’s Defense Ministry, and the darling of the air force, Embraer 
received a steady stream of government support. With the transition to democracy little 
changed as “democracy allowed organized groups to lobby for trade measures”(Barral, 
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2007, p.13). As a large firm, Embraer has unsurprisingly been able to put together an 
effective organized lobby group. Like Canada, regional interests also tend to dominate 
Brazilian politics as strong governors can dramatically influence presidential elections 
(Lee, 2007, p.17). As the prevailing industry in São Paulo region, presidential candidates 
who seek support from the São Paulo governor must cater to aerospace interests. An 
interesting note is how much of an impact the civil aircraft dispute had on Brazilian 
politics. In fact, Barral highlights that the case “triggered Brazilian pride in their most 
technologically sophisticated industry” and candidates began to argue over which party 
was responsible for the WTO claims (2007, p. 8&14). Moreover, the WTO dispute 
received “widespread attention in Brazilian internal politics, the private sector, and the 
media”(Schaffer, Ratton-Sanchez, and Rosenberg, 2006, p.14). Thus, as public outrage 
over Canada’s WTO suits and beef bans reached a fever pitch, it became politically 
beneficial to further support Embraer and act tough at the WTO. 
 In a less cynical view of foreign policy decisions, Judith Goldstein and Robert 
Keohane argue that ideas, just as much as SIG preferences, influence policy. For the two 
authors “ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody 
provide road maps”(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p.3). Furthermore, Goldstein and 
Keohane contend that policy choices have long lasting implications as they become 
embedded as norms. In the case of both Brazil and Canada it is not hard to see that the 
policy goal of a robust aerospace industry has become an entrenched idea. Because of 
their relatively small domestic economies, both countries rely on the success of their 
exporters. The problem for Brazil and Canada, however, is that their exports tend to be 
low-value commodities. The embedded policy goal is therefore to move beyond 
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commodities to value-added high technology exports. Canada, for instance, “is keen to 
move away from commodity dependence and to build its export competitiveness on 
knowledge”(Goldstein and McGuire, 2004, p.15). Therefore, supporting their aerospace 
industries is a priority as they represent major steps towards achieving the goal of an 
economy based on high-technology exports. For example, both companies are referred to 
as “national champions”(Froese, 2010, p.85) or “crown jewels”(Shaffer and Meléndez-
Ortiz, 2010, p.77) of their country’s industrial policy. Intransigence at the WTO could 
also be explained by fundamental beliefs on the role of the World Trade Organization 
itself. It is predictable that Canada would file suit against Brazil and its ProEx program as 
“faced with trade dependence, Canada naturally prefer[s] a robust, international 
framework regulating trade”(Goldstein and McGuire, 2004, p.19). In challenging what it 
sees as an unfair playing field for developing countries “the Brazilian strategy has been to 
act as a champion of developing countries” and contests components of the ASCM that 
were borrowed from the OECD Arrangement (a treaty no developing country took part in 
crafting). 
 If leaders in the Brazilian and Canadian governments were only concerned with 
maximizing national welfare then the cost of their subsidization program and the looming 
threat of reputation loss likely would have compelled them to reach an agreement during 
the consultation phase of their WTO spat. Instead, theory allows for, and the evidence 
demonstrates, the fact that there are a whole host of factors that can inform policy 
decisions.  In this instance votes were a rather salient consideration for both governments. 
For Canada, continued support for Bombardier delivered votes and campaign 
contributions for the Liberal party and mollified regional tensions. In Brazil, obstinacy at 
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the WTO was quite popular in the fledgling democracy and appealed to national pride. 
More to that point, national pride was certainly a determinant in both countries’ 
decisions. If either government failed to defend its aerospace firm, then it risked losing a 
“national champion” that was a major source of national pride. Finally, the decision to 
bear down during the WTO dispute represents the confluence of two imbedded policy 
goals for each country. For Brazil and Canada the aerospace industry is critically 
important for the long-term goal of shifting towards high value-added exports. In other 
words, an expensive subsidy program and the reputation costs of non-compliance would 
certainly be worth it if it meant securing the future economic vitality of the country. The 
second entrenched policy idea revolves around how both states view the purpose of the 
WTO. For Canada, ensuring a robust WTO regime is essential for its export based 
economy, while Brazil’s rallying cry has been supporting special treatment for 
developing countries at the WTO. 
Flaws in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
 Beyond just political economy considerations, the structure of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system itself is likely at fault for the duration of Brazil and Canada’s WTO 
dispute. The best way to think about the WTO is as a series of bilateral contracts in which 
each country extends the “most favored nation” trading status to all other signatories. 
While there are a set of minimum standards (the TRIPS agreement is a useful example) 
and basic auxiliary rules (procedural rules and financial contributions) that constitute 
erga omnes entitlements, the central foundation of the WTO is the bilateral market access 
entitlements. In order to be an effective contract the WTO must prevent ex post behavior 
that would violate the bilateral market access entitlements, while also allowing for 
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flexibility in the face of “regret contingencies”. According to Mahoney a regret 
contingency occurs “when the future diverges from what a party expected, he may 
conclude that the performance he will receive under the contract is no longer more 
valuable than the performance he must provide.” In terms of ex post flexibility, the WTO 
is quite weak as signatories lack explicit legal means to temporarily withdraw or deviate 
from the WTO contract. The lack of efficient escape clauses in the WTO “effectively 
blurs the line between good-faith and bad-faith (opportunistic) behavior”(Schropp, 2009, 
p. 237). The difficulty in discerning between good faith and opportunistic behavior was 
likely a major source tension between Brazil and Canada during the early stages of the 
dispute over regional jets. For instance, although Canada and Brazil’s initial subsidization 
programs were in violation of the ASCM, the aim of the subsidies was certainly not to 
undercut each other’s firms and capture excess rents at the expense of their competitor. 
The subsidies were instead meant to support R&D projects that private capital simply 
would not touch.  However, without realistic means of opting out and signaling good 
faith behavior, mutual suspicion was bound to arise. With heightened sensitivity towards 
opportunistic behavior on both sides, “the WTO contract effectively establishes violation-
cum-retaliation as the de facto rule”(Schropp, 2009, p.243). A regime of violation-cum-
retaliation is problematic for the WTO as retaliation is widely considered welfare 
depreciating. While larger states like the US and EU are generally able to absorb the cost 
of suspending concessions, smaller states find that the economic inefficiencies created by 
retaliation are unpalatable. Furthermore, states are often unable to find enough goods to 
tariff if they are not large trading partners with the injurer, or if their adversary only 
exports a few goods that are critical to the complainant’s economy. For example, Canada 
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faced this exact problem in enacting its award; “Canada just did not have enough 
products from Brazil that could be sourced from elsewhere if it used its full level of C$ 
344.2 million per annum”(Khabayan, 2010, p.279). Without the realistic ability to 
suspend concessions, injurers essentially get a free pass on their violation. Moreover, 
since “Game theory suggests that a threat is credible if players know ex ante that it will 
materialize” the lack of penalties for ex post violation increases the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior. With the WTO contract, then, “the injuring country can renege on 
the trade entitlement for free”(Schropp, 2009, p.247). In general, this has a detrimental 
impact on the WTO dispute settlement system and increases the instances of unresolved 
disputes “once a ruling has been issued a dispute is much less likely to end with full or 
partial satisfaction of the complainant’s initial demands”(Busch and Reinhardt, 2000, 
p.159).  More specifically, without a practical de jure mechanism for retaliation, the only 
way to strike back for Brazil and Canada during the regional jet dispute was to further 
subsidize. The net result of the WTO’s deficiencies, then, is that it incentivized jointly 
suboptimal subsidies and caused the two governments to act more belligerently than they 
otherwise would have. 
Conclusion 
 The decision to subsidize Bombardier and Embraer’s development of a regional 
jet was an unsurprising one and was in line with an established pattern of a generous 
government support for the country’s aerospace industry. In fact, the relationship 
between Bombardier and Embraer and their government is common worldwide as states 
are perpetually concerned with supporting the kind of high-technology firms that will be 
the economic engines of tomorrow. Problems arise, though, when two governments bent 
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on protecting their high-tech exporters throw concerns for present economic welfare by 
the wayside. The governments’ intransigence is fueled by mistrust for their subsidizing 
rival, domestic special interests, and policy goals that privilege securing long-term 
economic gains over present and short-term ones. This is what played out in the regional 
jet rivalry. The combined influence of special interest groups and the inability to credibly 
commit to not subsidizing caused the Brazilian and Canadian governments to slide into a 
welfare decreasing Nash equilibrium. What further exacerbated tensions were the rather 
glaring deficiencies of the WTO in handling a dispute of this nature. Had the two sides 
been able to signal that their subsidization was not intended to be opportunistic, then the 
consultation phase likely would have resulted in the kind of welfare improving agreement 
to limit subsidies that March Busch predicts. Instead, the dispute slipped into the 
violation-cum-retaliation scenario that is certainly counterproductive. To be fair, the 
GATT/WTO system of dispute settlement is oftentimes quite successful at resolving 
disputes; however, in this instance reputation costs were trumped by SIG preferences and 
domestic policy goals and the WTO dispute settlement system only served to magnify the 
antagonism between the two sides. Works	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